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Introduction 
Employee participation in a firm’s capital stock is one of the most important forms of 
financial participation. Stock option plans, stock bonus plans or direct accounts of a 
firm’s shares are different kinds of employee ownership. Throughout this article we 
will refer to these kinds of financial participation as employee share ownership (ESO). 
Both academics and political actors have highlighted the significant benefits associated 
with ESO for employees, employers and the state (e.g., European Commission, 2014: 
Lampel, Bhalla, & Jha, 2012; Pendleton, Poutsma, van Ommeren, & Brewster, 2001). 
However, ESO still is not very common in Germany. For instance, according to most 
recent establishment data from Germany, in 2011 only 2 per cent of all employers 
provided ESO (Möller, 2013). These numbers remained stable throughout the last 
years (Czaya & Matiaske, 2017). 
Against this background, during the past two decades the body of literature on 
the prevalence of ESO and associated benefits has been constantly growing. Thereby, 
a common research approach is to estimate regression models of the incidence of an 
ESO scheme – i.e., the fact that a firm provides ESO – on a set of explanatory varia-
bles. However, empirical evidence is restricted by data availability, as such research 
typically uses data from secondary sources. Hence, these studies allow only indirect in-
ferences about firms’ aims through the provision of ESO.  The following example il-
lustrates this prevalent research approach. According to agency theory, monitoring 
costs increase with firm size. Larger firms are expected to adopt an ESO scheme with 
higher probability as compared to smaller firms, since the provision of ESO is sup-
posed to contribute to an alignment of employees’ with employers’ interests and 
hence, will decrease monitoring costs. Thus, if research findings suggest a positive im-
pact of firm size on ESO incidence, it can be inferred from this result that a firm’s 
motivation to adopt an ESO scheme rests on the aim of reducing monitoring costs. 
However, this research approach has not remained uncriticised. As Ben-Ner and 
Jones (1995) put it already twenty years ago, “Ignoring the reason for adoption of an 
employee ownership scheme … leads to confounding the effects of employee share 
ownership schemes with the reasons for their adoption” (Ben-Ner & Jones, 1995, p. 
552). Specifically, we see the following two shortcomings. Firstly, from a methodolog-
ical point of view, measuring the motives of organisational decision makers through 
directly asking these individuals about their aims would imply higher validity as com-
pared to inferring these aims from regression models. In general, without exploring 
individual reasoning, rational choice theories remain infallible (Popper, 1994), and the 
theoretically derived assumptions are rather speculative. Secondly, there is a logical 
gap concerning smaller firms, since the reasoning based on monitoring costs can only 
explain why larger firms more often than smaller firms provide ESO. In contrast, the 
question why smaller firms provide ESO – what actually happens – remains unan-
swered. 
Our research approach seeks to overcome these shortcomings. In line with extant 
literature, we investigate firms’ aims through providing ESO. Yet different from pre-
vious studies we use primary data gathered through interviews with decision makers of 
firms that provide ESO. Furthermore, we take firm context into account, since firms 
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may pursue different aims through ESO, according to certain firm characteristics such 
as size or legal form. 
Therewith we respond to a call by Poutsma, Blasi and Kruse (2012) for a more 
intense consideration of contextual factors that affect organisational decisions and for 
“bringing agency back into our analyses of adoption and diffusion” (Poutsma et al., 
2012, p. 1514). Within an exploratory approach we examine the aims that different 
kinds of firms pursue through ESO. 
In our research, we apply cluster analysis methods to identify patterns of empiri-
cal prevalence, thereby using firm-level data gathered through telephone interviews 
with CEOs and heads of HR departments of firms in Germany. By explicitly focusing 
on the rationales of decision makers within firms, we contribute to knowledge on the 
business reasons for financial participation of employees. An analysis of employers’ ra-
tionales first hand is crucial for understanding dissemination patterns of financial par-
ticipation. In addition, knowing employers’ rationales is a necessary precondition for 
designing effective policy measures. 
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical approaches 
used in the literature to explain why firms adopt ESO schemes. In addition, it summa-
rises studies on the aims firms pursue through the provision of ESO. Section 3 intro-
duces the data used and the applied cluster analysis methods. Section 4 presents the 
results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the findings and presents our conclusion. 
Literature review 
In extant ESO literature, several theoretical perspectives have been applied to study 
the aims firms pursue through providing ESO to their employees. The most prevalent 
approaches include agency/contract, human resource management and institutionalist 
perspectives. Whereas the first two perspectives in particular are applied to study the 
relation of financial participation with employee attitudes and behaviour as well as 
firm performance, the institutionalist perspective is typically applied to comparatively 
study international contexts. In addition, several survey studies seek to empirically 
identify and categorise firms’ aims through ESO. These studies are mainly empirically 
driven with only weak theoretical grounding. 
Agency/contract perspective 
Literature based on agency theory in the tradition of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 1 
states that ESO is an effective instrument to control employee behaviour in two dis-
tinctive ways (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994; Pendleton, 2006; Poutsma, Lighthart, & 
Schouteten, 2005). First, while the interests of firm owners and their employees basi-
cally diverge, becoming co-owners of the firm will lead the employees to align their in-
terests to those of their employer. Since the income of an employee directly depends 
on the success of the firm, employees will adopt their employer’s interests to ensure 
their own welfare. That is, ESO fosters employee attitudes and behaviour that maxim-
                                                          
1 Though this reasoning gained prominence in the last decades, it should be noted that Jen-
sen and Meckling were highly critical about employee owned companies (e.g., Jensen & 
Meckling, 1979). 
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ise the profits of the firm on a long-term basis (Sengupta, Whitfield, & McNabb, 
2007).  
Second, according to Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) incentive contract theory, 
goal alignment of employers and employees is important, because a firm’s manage-
ment and the employees have different information about the employees’ individual 
productivity. Employees can use this information advantage to shirk at work, in par-
ticular in jobs where performance is difficult to monitor due to task complexity (Ji-
rjahn, 2000) or big firm size (Jensen & Meckling, 1992; Kruse, Blasi, & Park, 2008). 
Goal alignment through ESO decreases monitoring costs and the employees’ propen-
sity to shirk due to effective self- and peer-monitoring (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). As 
a means to combat shirking, ESO is superior to individual incentive systems, since the 
latter require monitoring routines that are costly and potentially create a climate of dis-
trust (Gibbons, 1998). However, ESO does not necessarily enhance goal alignment, 
but it also can have opposite effects. In particular in big firms, the relationship be-
tween individual performance and ESO – or: financial pay-offs based on ESO – is on-
ly weak, since increasing firm size is associated with growing ‘free rider’ or ‘1/N’ prob-
lem (Kandel & Lazear, 1992). In addition, it is not clear and has been subject of much 
debate, how the alignment of interests happens in practice (Pendleton, 1997). Mere 
ESO – through an additional reward – does not seem to have the potential to do so. 
Thus, we agree with Weitzman and Kruse (1990) who stated that “something more 
may be needed” (Weitzman & Kruse, 1990, p. 100). 
However, this theoretical reasoning related to both the determinants and the out-
comes of ESO is highly questionable. In the words of Blair (1999, p. 72): “If firm-
specific human capital is an important input in corporate enterprises, however, the 
classical principal-agent model may be too one-sided to describe the fundamental fea-
tures of the employment relationship.” Although several studies reveal a relationship 
between ESO and employee attitudes and behaviour, the reasoning concerning an 
alignment of interests is too simplistic and purely economically based. Motivation, sat-
isfaction and commitment are multifaceted constructs that emerge from different 
sources. The theoretical reasoning fails as long as the firm’s reasons for providing 
ESO and employees’ preferences are unknown.  
Human resource management perspective 
Human resource management scholars emphasise the positive effects of ESO on em-
ployee outcomes and overall firm performance. For instance, the concept of high per-
formance work systems (Becker & Huselid, 1998) considers ESO as one of the key el-
ements of a firm’s personnel policy. According to the proponents of this concept, fi-
nancial participation enhances employee identification with the employing firm and 
consequently performance. A prevalent theoretical approach linked to this reasoning 
is Klein’s (1987) satisfaction model. According to this model, ESO impacts employee 
attitudes and behaviour by means of three distinctive routes. First, the intrinsic route re-
fers to a direct relationship between ESO and employee commitment. Second, the in-
strumental route refers to an interaction of ESO with employee participation in decision-
making at all levels of the firm (Ben-Ner & Jones, 1995). Third, the extrinsic route also 
refers to an indirect relationship, thereby highlighting the importance of the fact that 
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employees perceive their work-effort to be connected to financial rewards (Buchko, 
1993; Pendleton, 2001). 
Previous research shows that increased employee commitment through ESO may 
lead to lower absenteeism (Brown, Fakhfakh, & Sessions, 1999) and reduced turnover 
(Buchko, 1992a, b; Festing, Groening, Kabst, & Weber, 1999; Poole & Jenkins, 1990). 
Further evidence suggests that ESO triggers employees to develop psychological own-
ership (Pierce, Rubenfeld, & Morgan, 1991; Pendleton, Wilson, & Wright, 1998), 
which in turn increases individual commitment, job satisfaction and organisational cit-
izenship behaviour (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 1991). In addition, there exists evidence 
that ESO enhances employer attractiveness of firms (Core & Guay, 2001).  
However, as Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2006) emphasise, it is not sufficient that 
a firm just provides ESO. Rather, the firm’s management needs to have a correspond-
ing human resource philosophy and to implement other personnel practices that fit 
together. This reasoning is in accordance with human resource management literature 
stressing that firms deploy bundles of interrelated practices which also include finan-
cial participation schemes (Gooderham, Parry, & Ringdahl, 2008). It also resembles 
the already quoted proposition by Weitzman and Kruse (1990, p. 100) that “some-
thing more may be needed” – not a single practice, but a bundle of several comple-
mentary personnel practices appears to be needed to increase firm level outcomes. 
Extant research indicates a positive impact of financial participation on firm per-
formance (Gooderham et al., 2008). Pendleton and Robinson (2011) show for British 
firms the benefits of a combination of ESO and personnel training. A coincidence of 
ESO and training opportunities is also found for U.S. firms (Kruse, Blasi, & Park, 
2008). In addition, the simultaneous provision of other forms of employee participa-
tion and voice systems plays an important role for the effectiveness of ESO, especially 
in firms where only a minority participates at ESO (Pendleton & Robinson, 2010). 
These empirical findings are also in line with Weitzman and Kruse (1990), since the 
findings indicate that providing ESO without accompanying practices may be ineffec-
tive.  
Institutionalist perspective 
From an institutionalist perspective in the sense of Scott (2001), certain legal regula-
tions foster – or hinder – firms to provide ESO. In particular, law concerning taxes 
and social insurance contributions enable firms to pursue financial aims through ESO 
(Kabst, Matiaske, & Schmelter, 2006). Other relevant institutions relate to the well-
functioning of the capital market. Since this article focuses on Germany, it should be 
noted that although German legislation and capital market institutions are tailored to 
facilitate ESO, there exist much stronger barriers than in other European countries 
(Kabst et al., 2006; Pendelton et al., 2001; Poutsma, 2001; Poutsma et al., 2012) and in 
the U.S. (Bernhardt & Witt, 1997). One of these barriers can be attributed to the in-
significant tax incentives for ESO offered even under the Law on Capital Participation 
of Empolyees from 2009. Another reason is that labour unions have been sceptical 
towards employee financial participation in the past decades (Lowitzsch & Iraji, 2014). 
Neo-institutional perspectives in the sense of Meyer and Rowan (1977) as well as 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) additionally stress the importance of legitimacy given by 
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a firm’s social environment. Thus, firms may aim at creating a positive image of them-
selves through ESO. A positive image is particularly important to firms that are under 
public observation – i.e., larger firms and stock-listed public firms – whereby this im-
portance varies across countries (Kabst et al., 2006). With respect to Germany and 
taking both facets of institutionalism into account, Sanders and Tuschke (2007) 
demonstrate the difficulties associated with the adoption of stock-based incentives for 
top managers within an institutional environment that was not in line with the princi-
ples of stock option pay.2  
Furthermore, previous research indicates that firms in their institutional context 
learn from each other and imitate personnel practices they observe as successful in 
other organisations, especially within their own industry (Poutsma et al., 2005; Hai-
peter, 2016). At the same time, these learning and imitating processes contribute to 
homogenisation of practices within a business field. In addition, according to neo-
institutionalist reasoning, once an ESO scheme has been implemented, it will be main-
tained. This reasoning also explains why multinational firms often transfer their hu-
man resource practices to subsidiaries abroad (Gooderham, Nordhaug, & Ringdal, 
1998). Likewise, Kabst et al. (2006) in their comparative study identify standardised 
practices concerning ESO among British, French and German firms. 
Categorizations of firms’ aims through ESO 
Research that directly addresses the aims that firms pursue through the provision of 
ESO is scarce. However, in Germany the topic has a long-standing tradition. Since the 
19th century, there has been a political debate on employee financial participation. In-
terestingly, back then the debate highlighted the same aims of firms as those currently 
discussed, including: improvement of firm productivity, increase of profits remaining 
within the firm, increase of employee motivation and identification with the organisa-
tion, stimulation of employees’ economic thinking and behaviour as well as increase of 
employee retention (Gaugler, 2002 for an overview). 
For the German context, Guski and Schneider (1983) provided an influential sys-
tematisation of firms’ aims through ESO. The authors identify the following seven 
aims: employee motivation, human resource policy, business financing, partnership, 
employee potential, social policy and capital formation. Based on two surveys of firms 
in Germany, Guski and Schneider (1983, 1995) show that the two most important 
aims are employee motivation and business financing. Scholand (2001) surveyed 97 
boards of directors of listed companies in Germany and found that aims related to 
personnel, such as employees’ identification with the firms’ goals, were rated as most 
important. Drawing on an in-depth analysis of the discourse on ESO in Germany, 
Hartz, Kranz and Steger (2009) identify two additional interrelated aims: ESO con-
tributes to reconciliation between capital and labour and facilitates the privatisation of 
formerly state-owned firms.  
                                                          
2 Although stock option schemes for top managers differ from ESO in several ways, the 
findings from Sanders and Tuschke (2007) principally may hold true for ESO, too, in par-
ticular concerning challenges associated with tax and pension legislation. 
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Studies in other countries than Germany revealed similar findings. In an early 
study in the U.S., 60 per cent of the firms with a stock exchange listing and with ESO 
stated that they aimed at achieving some form of attitude change among employees 
(Dewe, Dunn, & Richardson, 1988). This attitude change referred to employee in-
volvement, commitment, co-operation, loyalty, participation, communication and 
sense of belonging. The change processes intended to encourage employees to more 
strongly identify with the aims of the firm and to align interests of employees and 
shareholders. A large-scale survey among Australian firms identified three broad cate-
gories of aims (House of Representatives, 2000, cited by Barnes, Josey, Marshall, 
Mitchell, Ramsay, & Rider, 2006): ownership (e.g., securing employee engagement), 
remuneration (e.g., the financial value of shares) and workplace change (e.g., reduce 
industrial disharmony). In an Austrian survey firms rated the increase of employee 
identification and strengthening of their entrepreneurial attitude as important aims 
(Vevera, 2005). Schwarb, Greiwe and Niederer (2001) find similar results for Switzer-
land. The surveyed firms stated that ESO had a positive impact on employee motiva-
tion/improved performance and entrepreneurial attitude. 
To summarise, extant evidence indicates that there is a wide spectrum of aims 
that firms pursue through the provision of ESO. Thereby, firms simultaneously pur-
sue a bundle of aims, rather than single ones. However, while in the ESO literature 
the same aims are continuously repeated, we maintain that the relevance of these aims 
is context sensitive. By the term “context” we refer to the institutional framework, i.e., 
legislation – in particular, tax legislation -, the viewpoints of social partners and the 
prevalence of certain legal forms of firms’. In the German context, over a long period 
legislature has been following the reserved stance of the social partners. In particular, 
labour unions opposed employee financial participation in favour of wage and social 
policy (Bontrup & Springob, 2002; Tofaute, 1998). Against the background of Euro-
pean policy initiatives promoting employee financial participation, the attitude of 
German policy makers changed. Within tax legislation they induced minor reliefs, such 
as increasing tax exemptions for employees. However, German legislation is still less 
supportive of ESO as compared to other countries (Lowitzsch & Iraji, 2014). A fur-
ther characteristic of the German context is the comparatively small share of public 
firms, i.e. firms with those kinds of legal forms that facilitate ESO (The World Bank, 
World Development Indicators, 2016). 
Altogether, whereas the bundles of firms’ aims seem to be well known, scientific 
knowledge on their prevalence – especially in light of the fact that their relevance is 
context specific – is limited. In the following, within an exploratory approach we seek 
to empirically identify such patterns of firms’ aims, thereby taking account of a set of 
firm characteristics. 
Methods 
Data and sampling procedure 
The data used in this article originate from a larger project on financial participation. 
They were gathered via standardised, fully structured, computer-assisted telephone in-
terviews (CATI) with CEOs and heads of personnel of private sector firms located in 
Germany. A professional market research firm conducted the interviews during No-
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vember 2007. Although the interviews date back to several years ago, we suppose the 
findings to be still valid. This position is supported by Bellmann and Möller (2016) as 
well as by Czaya and Matiaske (2017) who find that during the past years neither the 
financial crisis nor changes in law altered the prevalence of financial participation in 
Germany. The sampling procedure was based on an industrial premises directory and 
considered only medium-sized and large firms with at least 150 employees. 
A total of 1,201 firms were interviewed. The response rate was 18.2 per cent, 
which is satisfactory. 3  The average interview duration was 22 minutes. Of the 
1,201 firms that had responded, 57 firms (4.8 per cent) indicated that they provide ESO. 
Table 1:  Measures 
Variable Measure 
1. ESO Employees directly participate at shares/equity: 0 = no; 1 = yes 
2. Profit sharing Employees directly participate at profit: 0 = no; 1 = yes 
3. Direct decision participation Employees participate at decision-making, e.g., decentralised responsibilities, au-
tonomous work groups; 0 = no; 1 = yes 
4. Indirect decision participation Index: sum of the following variables concerning the ways of employee participa-
tion at decision-making: a) delegation of responsibilities and decision-making to 
lower hierarchical levels; b) implementation of autonomous work groups; c) formal 
feedback, management by objectives; d) quality circles; e) participation at planning 
and implementation of new technologies; f) routine employee surveys; g) other: 0 = 
no; 1 = yes 
5. Firm size For regression analysis: log number of employees; for cluster analysis: variable 
“large firm” with 0 = no; 1 = yes 
6. Foreign parent company 0 = no; 1 = yes 
7. Region 0 = West Germany; 1 = East Germany 
8. Legal form Dummy variables for: a) GmbH/GmbH & Co.KG; b) AG/KGaA; c) other (Ref.) 
9. Industry Dummy variables for: a) manufacturing−basic products processing; 
b) manufacturing−producer goods; c) manufacturing−consumer goods; d) energy, 
mining; e) banking, insurances; f) other services; g) construction, retail, transport, 
communication (Ref.) 
10. Aims Categorial variable: 1 = improvement of work motivation and performance;  
2 = improvement of corporate climate; 3 = improvement of corporate image;  
4 = enhancement of recruitment chances; 5 = entrepreneurial behaviour of em-
ployees; 6 = reduction of employee absences; 7 = reduction of employee turnover; 
8 = improvement of employee retention; 9 = pay flexibilisation;  
10 = enhancement of liquidity; 11 = enhancement of equity capital;  
12 = employees become co-owners 
                                                          
3 The population comprises 24,933 firms with at least 150 employees (special analysis of 
the Establishment History Panel of the Federal Employment Agency). Target figure of 
the net sample were 1,200 conducted interviews. Of 6,589 selected firms, 13.5 per cent 
could not be reached (target person or firm). The remaining 68.3 per cent refused to par-
ticipate or did not finish the interview. 
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The average firm size was 2,184 employees (standard deviation = 4,505; mini-
mum = 150; maximum = 23,000; median = 480). Regarding industrial sectors, 
47.1 per cent operated in manufacturing of basic products, producer goods or con-
sumer goods, 7.0 per cent in energy and mining, 5.3 per cent in banking and insuranc-
es, 15.8 per cent in other services and 21.1 per cent in construction, retail, transport 
and communication. Within the 57 firms that provide ESO, the coverage of the ESO 
schemes in terms of the share of entitled employees averages 82.7 per cent, and the 
firms’ shares held by the employees average 15.4 per cent. 
Measures 
We measured the incidence of ESO, related aims and firm characteristics through self-
developed single-item questions. In addition, we consider several control variables fol-
lowing Poutsma, Kalmi and Pendleton (2006). Table 1 presents the variable names, 
items and response scales. 
Analytical procedure 
Because we are mainly interested in specific empirical distribution patterns, we chose a 
cluster analytical approach to identify subsets of similar firms and the aims these firms 
pursue through ESO. Cluster analysis also suits our purposes because of the explora-
tory nature of our research and the small sample size. We applied the hierarchical clus-
ter analysis method that identifies homogeneous subsets within the data – i.e., specific 
clusters of cases – according to several predefined criteria (e.g., Hair et al., 2010). This 
method groups cases in such a way that it maximises homogeneity within clusters 
while at the same time maximising heterogeneity between clusters. As agglomeration 
method we applied the Ward algorithm that at every stage puts together two clusters, 
thereby minimising the square sums of the considered variables within all clusters. As 
proximity measure we chose the binary Euclidean distance. 
To determine the criteria that are supposed to define the clusters we draw on the 
results of a logistic regression analysis of the incidence of ESO, based on the complete 
data set. That is, prior to the cluster analysis of the 57 firms that actually provide ESO 
we estimated a regression model of the probability that a firm does so. 
After we have identified the firm clusters, we examine the relations of the firm 
clusters with specific patterns of aims pursued by firms through ESO. We will analyse 
these relations primarily through visual inspection of a graph. Since our interviews ad-
dressed twelve different aims and this number seems to be too large to be related to 
only a few clusters, we condensed these twelve aims into a smaller number of bundles 
of aims. To this end we applied a principal component (factor) analysis with Varimax 
rotation. 
Results 
Determining the criteria for the cluster analysis 
The first stage of the empirical analysis comprised a regression analysis that aimed at 
identifying those firm characteristics that affect the probability of a firm to provide 
ESO. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables con-
sidered in the regression analysis.  
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Table 2:  Means, standard deviations and correlationsa 
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Table 3 presents the results of a logistic regression. The model estimation explains 
about 16 per cent of the variance concerning the provision of ESO (Pseudo R2 = .164, 
log Likelihood = -180,130, LR = 54.27 with p < .01).  
Table 3:  Results of the logistic regression of the provision of ESOa 
 Marginal effect # s.e. 
Constant -.163***  
Profit sharing (1=yes) .048*** .010 
Direct decision participation (0-7) -.001 .001 
Indirect decision participation (1=yes) -.006 .015 
Firm size (log no. of employees) .008* .004 
Foreign parent company (1=yes) .037*** .013 
Region (0=West Germany, 1=East Germany) -.002 .016 
Legal form: GmbH/GmbH & Co.KG (1=yes) -.008 .020 
Legal form: AG/KGaA (1=yes) .041* .021 
Industry: manufacturing−basic products (1=yes) -.017 .016 
Industry: manufacturing−producer goods (1=yes) -.011 .015 
Industry: manufacturing−consumer goods (1=yes) -.007 .021 
Industry: energy, mining (1=yes) .013 .022 
Industry: banking, insurances (1=yes) -.008 .025 
Industry: other services (1=yes) -.011 .016 
n 992  
Log Likelihood -180,130  
LR 54.27***  
Pseudo R2 .164  
a Coefficients are marginal effects whose size can be compared across the explanatory variables within the estimated 
model. 
 * p < .10  ** p < .05  *** p < .01 
 
According to Table 3, four coefficients are statistically significant. The following ex-
planatory variables relate to the provision of ESO: (1) provision of profit sharing (mar-
ginal effect = .048, p < .01), (2) foreign parent company (m.e. = .008, p < .01), (3) firm 
size (m.e. = .048, p < .10) and (4) legal form is public firm, i.e., AG/KGaA (m.e. = 
.041, p < .10). All coefficients have positive signs, indicating a higher prevalence of 
ESO within big firms that also provide profit sharing, that are a subsidiary of a foreign 
company and that have the legal form of an AG/KGaA. 
At the next stage of the analysis, we fed these four variables into the cluster anal-
ysis of those 57 firms that actually provide ESO. 
296  Renate Ortlieb, Wenzel Matiaske, Simon Fietze: Employee share ownership in Germany 
Identifying the clusters 
As described in the methods section, we applied a hierarchical cluster analysis, thereby 
using the Ward algorithm and the Euclidean distance measure. The four predefined 
criteria are binary dummy-coded variables with “1”, if a firm has the respective charac-
teristic, and “0” otherwise. This procedure yielded an optimal solution that comprises 
four clusters. Table 4 displays the characteristics of the four clusters. 
Table 4:  Results of the cluster analysisa 
 Cluster 1 (n = 13) 
Cluster 2 
(n = 22) 
Cluster 3 
(n = 11) 
Cluster 4 
(n = 11) 
Total 
(n = 57) 
Foreign parent company 0 1 (5%) 0 11 (100%) 12 (21%) 
Public firm (legal form = AG/KGaA) 7 (54%) 13 (59%) 0 2 (18%) 22 (39%) 
Large firm (≥ 500 employees) 0 22 (100%) 0 6 (55%) 28 (49%) 
Profit sharing 13 (100%) 17 (77%) 0 11 (100%) 41 (72%) 
Short label “SME w/ pr.sh.” 
“Big 
w/ pr.sh.” 
“SME 
non-pub 
no pr.sh.” 
“Foreign 
w/ pr.sh.” 
 
a n = 57 firms. Values represent counts and shares of firms to which the respective characteristic applies within the respec-
tive cluster.  
 
Drawing on the findings in Table 4, we characterise the four clusters as follows.  
Cluster 1: “German small and medium-sized firms with profit sharing (SME w/ pr.sh.)” 
Cluster 1 comprises 13 small and medium-sized firms (150-499 employees) whose 
headquarters are located in Germany. All firms provide profit sharing, and nearly half 
of them are public firms (legal form is AG/KGaA).  
Cluster 2: “German big firms with profit sharing (Big w/ pr.sh.)” 
Similar to Cluster 1, almost all of the 22 firms within Cluster 2 are German and the 
majority of these firms provide profit sharing. Yet in contrast to Cluster 1, Cluster 2 
comprises only big firms employing at least 500 persons and a comparatively large 
number of public firms. 
Cluster 3: “German small and medium-sized, non-public firms without profit sharing 
(SME non-pub, no pr.sh.)” 
The 11 firms within Cluster 3 are characterised by maximum homogeneity. Neither of 
them belongs to a foreign parent company nor do they provide profit sharing. In addi-
tion, Cluster 3 comprises only small and medium-sized firms employing 150-
499 persons and no public firms. 
Cluster 4: “Foreign firms with profit sharing (Foreign w/ pr.sh.)” 
The most salient characteristic of the 11 firms within Cluster 4 is that all of them are 
subsidiaries of foreign parent companies. All firms provide profit sharing. Slightly 
more than the half of these firms are big and the majority are non-public firms. 
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To examine the reliability of the cluster solution, we first inspected the dendro-
gram. Since the graph showed a considerable jump between the five-clusters solution 
and the four-clusters solution, the four-clusters solution seems to be the optimum. As 
an alternative to Ward’s procedure, we applied two-step clustering procedures. The 
two procedures yielded similar results. In this article, we report the results following 
Ward’s procedure, because they are easier to interpret. Overall, the results indicate a 
good reliability of the chosen cluster solution. 
To check the validity of the cluster solution, we conducted Chi-square tests. All 
of the differences listed in Table 4 are statistically significant (p < .01). In addition, we 
computed bivariate correlation coefficients. None of the correlation coefficients were 
statistically significant (p < .05). Thus, the validity of the cluster solutions seems to be 
good. 
Relating the clusters to aims of ESO 
At this stage of the analysis, the question is whether the firm clusters are also related 
to different patterns of aims that firms pursue through ESO. We considered four dif-
ferent bundles of aims, which we identified based on a principal component analysis 
of the 12 original variables. As extraction method, we chose principal component 
analysis. Furthermore, we applied Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation. The ro-
tation converged after 5 iterations. Table 5 presents the factor loadings that resulted 
from this procedure. 
Table 5:  Results of the principal component analysis of aims pursued by firms 
through ESOa 
Factor label Aim Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
“Attraction and retention” Recruiting .76    
 Retention .63    
 Turnover (low) .76    
 Absenteeism (low) .62    
 Corporate climate .70    
“Performance” Co-ownership  .88   
 Entrepreneurial behaviour  .83   
 Work motivation  .80   
“Finance” Equity capital   .94  
 Liquidity   .86  
“Image, no pay flexibility” Corporate image     .76 
 Pay flexibility    -.75 
a n = 57 firms. Principal component analysis with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalisation (5 iterations). Coefficients rep-
resent factor loadings. Share of variance explained = 70.1%.  
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Figure 1:  Relation of firm clusters with aims pursued by firms through ESOa 
   
a n = 57 firms. Data points represent the share of those firms within a cluster whose management ascribes high importance 
to the respective aim. Thereby, “high importance” means a value above the median value over all firms. 
 
In Figure 1, the data points on the horizontal and vertical lines represent the share of 
firms within a cluster that ascribe high importance to the respective aim. We classify 
an aim as “highly important”, if a firm’s value of this variable is larger than the median 
value of all 57 considered firms. 
Figure 1 clearly shows that the aims pursued by firms through ESO differ accord-
ing to the cluster characteristics. Firms belonging to Cluster 1 – i.e., small and medi-
um-sized German firms that also provide profit sharing – in particular pursue aims re-
lated to finance and employee performance, whereas the two other aims play a minor 
role. In contrast, firms of Cluster 2 – i.e., big German firms that also provide profit 
sharing – pursue mainly aims related to the attraction and retention of personnel as 
well as to corporate image. The results concerning Cluster 3 – i.e., small and medium-
sized non-public firms that do not provide profit sharing – fit within this picture. 
Similar to the SMEs of Cluster 1, firms belonging to Cluster 3 in particular pursue fi-
nancial aims. However, Cluster 3 firms pursue image aims, too, similar to the big 
German firms of Cluster 2. Finally, as to Cluster 4 – i.e., foreign-owned firms that also 
provide profit sharing – the high importance of employee performance aims is re-
markable. In contrast, the role of image or finance-related aims is negligible. Only one 
category of aims does not vary across firm clusters. Aims related to employee attrac-
tion and retention are of almost equal importance to firms of all clusters. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Our analysis of the aims that firms pursue through the provision of ESO revealed a 
distinctive pattern of relationships between the clusters and the aims pursued by firms 
through ESO. Employee performance aims are most important to foreign-owned 
firms, financial aims are most important to SMEs and corporate image aims are most 
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important to big firms and to firms that do not provide profit sharing. However, the 
importance of aims related to employee attraction and retention does not vary across 
firm clusters.  
In contrast to previous studies on ESO that do not distinguish between different 
kinds of firms, our findings suggest that different kinds of firms pursue different aims. 
In addition, our findings underscore the importance of taking account of bundles of 
aims instead of single aims. Since the firm characteristics of Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 are 
quite similar, with firm size being the main difference, it is interesting to note that the 
smaller firms (like those of Cluster 3) put more emphasis on the ‘harder’ financial 
aims, as compared to the larger firms. The aims of equity capital and liquidity are more 
important to German SMEs than to large German firms, suggesting that SMEs have a 
different financing need than larger firms. The ongoing major changes in capital sup-
ply of German firms affects in particular SMEs. They face an increasing difficulty to 
get loans from their banks (Söllner, 2011). ESO is one way to satisfy these financing 
needs. At the same time, the higher importance of aims related to corporate image to 
firms of Cluster 2 may be traced back to the higher visibility of these large firms by 
the public.  
Furthermore, the firms of Cluster 3 also pursue financial aims, but without 
providing profit sharing. Instead of offering such an additional financial bonus to their 
employees, their aims through ESO further include improved corporate image (but 
not pay flexibility).  By contrast, firms belonging to Cluster 4 – i.e., foreign-owned 
firms that also provide profit sharing – mainly pursue performance aims. This finding 
is in line with previous research, according to which foreign-owned firms transfer 
ESO schemes to their German subsidiaries (Gooderham et al., 1998; Kabst et al., 
2006). This finding also indicates that the aims through ESO vary according to a 
firm’s institutional context. 
A further interesting finding of our study is that the aims related to employee at-
traction and retention are fairly equally important to all firms, irrespective of firm size, 
legal form, whether the firm has a foreign parent company and whether it provides 
profit sharing or not. Since our sample contains only firms with more than 
150 employees, we expect these businesses to have a professional human resource 
management as well as a strategy to cope with the so-called ‘war for talents’ and to 
take account of future trends concerning workforce demography. That is, these firms 
have reached a critical size where such aims are crucial for survival. Furthermore, 
these findings suggest that firms imitate each other in this regard, as stated by neo-
institutionalist perspectives (DiMaggio & Poewell, 1983; Poutsma et al., 2005). 
Our findings are also of general theoretical interest, as they unveil problems of ra-
tional choice theories. Whenever action theory serves as an argumentative base – as 
outlined above -, explanations remain ‘meaningless’, as long as the motives or aims 
behind the action are not observed. If aims are of other than monetary nature – which 
is an empirical fact that is often ignored by economists – these explanations immunise 
themselves, thereby resulting in ad-hoc interpretations. Once more taking agency the-
ory as an example, according to which monitoring problems increase with firm size, 
the fundamental question reads: do firms – no matter what sizes – have monitoring 
problems at all? As Pendleton (1997) argues, “large firms tend to develop formal con-
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trols and performance measures to guide employee behaviour, so the overall quality of 
monitoring may well be better than in small firms” (Pendleton, 1997, p. 105). Moreo-
ver, rationality also means that there are different rationalities of a reason. Thus, ex-
ploring these rationales is crucial. Organisational theory – and especially human re-
source management, where we observe different bundles of firms’ aims – should be 
careful with hasty conclusions in analogy with economic action logic. Hence, future 
research on rationales behind management practices is needed in order to improve 
theorising on organisational decisions. 
A further implication of our research findings for future research refers to institu-
tional context. As our study indicates that the importance of firms’ aims vary across 
firm clusters, and thus, according to the institutional context, country comparative 
studies are needed. These studies should take account of not only context characteris-
tics but also the reasoning behind ESO. We suggest that for this kind of future re-
search, in contrast to methodological approaches that infer firms’ aims from the mere 
incidence of ESO, a survey approach that directly captures the aims that firms pursue 
through providing ESO schemes – as we chose for this study – present a fruitful start-
ing point. 
However, despite the methodological advantages of our study, we also see several 
limitations. For instance, the telephone interviews offered little opportunity to clarify 
problems of meaning and situational definitions. In addition, we were neither able to 
obtain detailed descriptions of the ESO schemes – that will differ between firms – nor 
to get deeper insight into the question why the decision-makers had developed certain 
motives. Future research adopting a case study design is needed to shed light on these 
complex processes and political practices underlying the decisions to provide or not to 
provide ESO. 
Moreover, a drawback of our research relates to the date of the survey. Although 
we maintain that the fact that the prevalence of ESO in Germany did not change dur-
ing the last years indicates that the studied relationships stayed the same, we cannot be 
sure that management rationales did not change. Accordingly, a follow-up study is 
needed to establish potential changes in this regard. 
In conclusion, this study offers new insights into motives of firms to provide 
ESO to their employees. By choosing a methodological approach that directly ad-
dressed firms’ aims, as stated by interviewed organisational decision-makers, it over-
comes shortcomings of extant research that only indirectly identified firms’ aims 
through theoretical and statistical inferences. The findings indicate that through the 
provision of ESO, firms pursue specific patterns of aims, according to several firm 
characteristics. As institutional context of firms matters for the relative importance of 
aims related to employee performance, employee attraction and retention, financing or 
corporate image, this study suggests that future research and policies not only should 
be interested in the concrete rationales of organisational decision makers, but also in 
their context. 
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